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THE EXCUSE OF IAWOSSIBILITY IN WEST
VIRGINIA CONTRACT LAW
CLYDE L. COLSON '
T HIS war, like all others, with its priorities, scarcity of ma-
terials and disruption' of transportation facilities will make the
performance of many contracts impossible. Hence it will not be
untimely to consider some aspects of the question of the extent to
which impossibility is recognized as an excuse for nonperformance
of a contract.
As defined in the Restatement of Contracts, "impossibility
means not only strict impossibility but impracticability because of
extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss in-
volved."" Note then that impossibility, as used in this connection,
does not mean absolute impossibility but rather that performance
of the promise has become so impracticable as to make it mani-
festly unfair and inequitable to enforce it. Though our court has
not always kept this in mind, that it does recognize the sound-
ness of the proposition is evidenced by this statement in Paxtow
Lumnber Co., lit. v. Panther Coal Co.:
"Though, generally speaking, a promisor is bound to com-
ply with the express terms of his agreement, there appears to
be manifestly increasing tendency to afford him relief upon
equitable principles where great hardship necessarily would
ensue by forcing him to do what circumstances have rendered
practically impossible of performance." 2
Obviously this tendency if carried too far would seriously
impair the policy of the law favoring security and certainty in
* Professor of Law, 'West Virginia University.
I RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §454.
2 83 W. Va. 341, 352, 98 S. E. 563 (1919).
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matters of commercial law. On the other hand to refuse any relief
on the ground of impossibility- to hold the parties to the strict
letter of their contract, exacting the pound of flesh unless the
parties have expressly provided for an excuse in the event of the
particular contingency which has occurred - would mark a return
to the period of "strict law" when the function of the court was
thought to be the strict enforcement of bargains however harsh
rather than the achievement in the particular case of a just and
equitable result.3 The choice of alternatives was well stated by
Williston:
"The law must adopt either a strict rule which will re-
quire the parties, when they form a contract, to foresee its con-
sequences as accurately as possible, though at the expense of
serious hardship to one of them if unforeseen circumstances
render it impossible to perform his promise, or a rule giving an
excuse under such circumstances. The early cases accepted
the former alternative; the later cases tend to adopt the
other. ' 4
Note that even under the modern tendency an excuse should
and will be allowed only in cases of extreme hardship. Hence mere
unforeseen difficulty or increased expense of performance will not
constitute an excuse., Thus in McCormick v. JordoP the added
expense and difficulty of drilling an oil well, occasioned by the loss
of tools and by the fact that the sand which the driller was sup-
posed to reach was lower than had been anticipated, was held to be
no excuse for the driller's failure to complete the well. Although
the result reached in this case was correct because the unforeseen
difficulty was not so great as to render performance of the promise
a " The idea in each case is that a man of fuAl age must take care of him-
self. There is no legal paternalism or maternalism to save him from himself.
If he has made a foolish bargain he must perform his side like a man, for he
has but himself to blame; if he has acted, he has done so at his own risk with
a duty of keeping his eyes open, and he must abide the appointed consequences.
In short he must 'be a good sport' and bear his losses smiling. Hence the stock
argument of the strict law for the many harsh rules it enforces is that the
situation was produced by the party's own folly and he must abide it. But
the whole point of view is that of primitive society, and, despite the eulogies
which have been pronounced upon these features of the strict law as molders
of strong and self-reliant character, it may be asserted confidently that they
were not devised to any such end, that at best they subserve such an end but
little, and that they defeat social interests of general security and general
morals and individual interests of personality and substance which the law
ought to protect." Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Bules and
Doctrines (1914) 27 HAnv. L. RB-y. 195, 212-213.
4 6 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) § 1931.
5 RESTATEMFNT, CONTRACTS §§ 454 and 467.
6 65 W. Va. 86, 63 S. E. 778 (1909).
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impossible in the sense of impracticale, the court as is generally
true in the older cases stated its holding in much broader and
stricter language:
" 'It is a well settled rule of law, that if a party by his
contract charge himself with an obligation possible to be per-
formed, he must make it good, unless its performance is
rendered impossible by the act of God, the law or the other
party. Unforeseen difficulties, however great, will not excuse
himn. . .. ))7
This language is subject to two criticisms. In the first place,
in stating that unforeseen difficulties "however great" would eon-
stitute no defense, the court overlooked the principle recognized
in the Paxton Lumber Comnp any case that impracticability by rea-
son of extreme difficulty or hardship may be an excuse. All that
the court needed to say to reach its result in the McCormick case
was that mere unforeseen difficulty is no excuse. In the second
place, this language in its reference to an "act of God" evidences a
confusion of terms often found in cases dealing with impossibility.
However correct it may be to say that "vis major" or "an act of
God" will excuse a common carrier from performance of its duties,
it is only misleading to use these terms in respect to impossibility
ws an excuse for nonperformance of ord-inary contractual duties'
It is the fact of impossibility and not its cause which con-
stitutes the excuse. For example, take the case of the destruction
of the subject matter of a contract to sell specific property, which
all courts recognize as an excuse for nonperformance. If A has
contracted to sell a specific horse and thereafter the horse is de-
stroyed by fire, A, if not himself at fault, is excused whether the
fire was due to an act of God, to the act of a third party, or to any
other cause. On the other hand, if A was at fault he would not be
excused even though the impossibility was due to an act of God.
Thus, in a West Virginia case involving a subcontract for con-
struction of part of a bridge, which contract had already been
broken before further delay and expqense was caused by the destruc-
tion by flood of part of the work, the court said that "Vis major
excuses the party asserting it only when he himself is not at fault."0
Hence it is clear that the decision of a particular case, instead of
7Xd. at 90.
8 6 WImIISToN, CoNTR.AcTs § 1936; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 457, com-
ment c.
9 Mills v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 114 W. Va. 263, 265,
171 S. E. 532 (1933).
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turning on whether there was an act of God involved, is controlled
by considerations entirely different.
Aside from the fact, however, that the presence or absence
of an act of God is in no way controlling, use of the term is likely
to lead to an even more serious error. Starting with the law of
common carriers where the term is properly applicable, and being
mindful of the earlier strict doctrine as to impossibility, courts have
often drawn the wholly erroneous conclusion that impossibility due
to an act of God is no excuse for the nonperformance of a contract.
Thus as late as 1925, in contrast to the directly opposite statement
in the McCormick case, we find our court saying,
"It is a well established principle of law that while an
'Act of God', unavoidable accident, or the stress of circum-
stances may not excuse the non-performance of an obligation
created by contract, they will excuse the non-performance of a
duty imposed by law."10
Yet nothing could be clearer than that in the example given above
A is excused from the performance of his contract to deliver the
horse whether its destruction was due to an act of God or to any
other cause. Obviously our thinking would be clearer if we should
discard the use of the terms vis major and act of God when dis-
cussing the problem of impossibility.
Another example of the principle that mere unforeseen diffi-
culty or added expense will constitute no excuse is found in cases
where a change in economic conditions renders a contract more
burdensome. In Rice & Co. v. Roberts the defendant had con-
tracted in 1932 to buy a shipment of jewelry from the plaintiff,
but upon its arrival he refused to accept the shipment stating to
the plaintiff that "conditions are such at this time we do not feel
that we can sell enough of this merchandise to be able to pay you."I'
It was quite properly held that the defendant's prospective in-
ability to pay for the goods because of unsatisfactory business con-
ditions was not an excuse for breach of the contract.
This last case also raises the point as to the difference be-
tween objective and subjective impossibility. Impossibility of per-
forming a promise may be due either to the nature of the perform-
ance or to the inability of the particular person who made the
promise. If the performance is in its nature impossible of accom-
plishment by anyone, we have a case of objective impossibility. On
10 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Board, 100 W. Va. 222, 225, 130 S. E. 524, 44 A.
L. R. 826 (1925).
"1114 W. Va. 549, 550, 172 S. E. 615 (1934).
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the other band if the performance is in its nature capable of ac-
complishment, but cannot be given because of the inability of the
particular promisor, we have a case of subjective impossibility.
Mere subjective impossibility is never held to be an excuse.12 Some-
times, however, as in the case of a contract for personal service
which is impossible of performance because of the illness of the
promisor, performance is both subjectively and objectively im-
possible. When this is true the promisor may be excused because
of the objective impossibility despite the fact that there is also
subjective impossibility. The best example of subjective im-
possibility is a promisor's inability to pay a promised consideration,
which is never an excuse for nonpayment.13 In the Rice case the
prospective impossibility was really subjective and hence in any
event would have been no defense. Another recognition of the
principle that subjective impossibility is not an excuse is found
in the case of Wheeling Mold & Foundry Co. v. W7eeling Steel
& Iron Co., where it was held that a prouisor's failure to complete
and deliver machinery within the time specified was not excused
by a showing that in his effort to perform he had used due diligence
and all the means within his power. 4 Many other examples of sub-
jective impossibility may be found in the West Virginia cases.!'
It should be observed, however, that the parties may by express
provision make subjective impossibility an excuse for nonperform-
ance.10
Still another common instance of subjective impossibility is
worthy of special note -namely, a promise to do an act which
cannot be done without the consent or cooperation of a third per-
son. In such a case, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the one making the promise may fairly be said to assume the risk
of his inability to obtain the other's consent or assistance. His
inability to do so will not be an excuse unless the terms or the
nature of the contract show that he did not assume the risk.'7 Thus,
in Roberts v. American Column & Lumber Co,.,18 it was held that
a promise to acquire rights of way over the land of third parties,
providing access for the cutting of timber, was not discharged by
12 6 WILLISTON, CONMACTS § 1932; RESTATMEENT, CONTRACTs § 455.
'3 McConnell & Drummond v. Hewes, 50 W. Va. 33, 40 S. E. 436 (1901).
'4 58 W. Va. 62, 51 S. E. 129 (1905).
15 For example, see Young v. Jordan, 106 W. Va. 139, 145 S. E. 41 (1928);
Biederman, Inc. v. Henderson, 115 W. Va. 374, 176 S. E. 433 (1934).
16 Robinson v. Kistler, 62 W. Va. 489, 59 S. E. 505 (1907).
17 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1932.
is 76 W. Va. 290, 85 S. E. 535 (1915).
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a refusal of the third parties to grant the rights of way. This
holding is sound enough because mere subjective impossibility is
never an excuse. The court, however, did not place its decision on
this well recognized ground, but stated broadly that
" '... when the party by his own contract creates a duty
or charge upon himself he is bound to make it good, if be may,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because
he might have provided against it by his contract'. . . three
exceptions to the rule are noted: first, where the subsequent
impossibility is imposed by law; second, where the continued
existence of the subject matter is an implied condition of the
contract; third, in contracts for personal services, 'in which
there is generally the implied condition that the person who
is to render the service is alive and not incapacitated by ill-
nessY. 31
This language admirably illustrates the method by which
judges often overrule or modify strict doctrines without admitting
even to themselves that they are doing so. The first part of the
quotation is a fair statement of the strict view originally taken.
Then the attitude of the courts was that the law should not make
a new contract for the parties but should enforce the contract as
made without modification. This on the theory that one should not
complain of his own folly in failing to provide for possible con-
tingencies. It is doubtful whether the law ever enforced this rule
without some exceptions.20 However that may be, the courts have
continued to repeat the original strict doctrine as the general rule,
but there are so many now well-recognized exceptions that the rule
can no longer bd said to be of general application. These exceptions
have been established under the guise of implied conditions, 21 as
witness the second and third exceptions mentioned by our court in
the language quoted above.
It is doubtful whether a court fools itself by such a resort to
implied or constructive conditions. Does the court really think that
it enforces the contract as made by the parties when it reads into
the contract an implied condition relieving one of them from the
consequence of having failed to guard against an unforeseen or
uncontemplated contingency? It should be quite apparent that, to
the extent necessary to the achievement of a result consonant with
the court's sense of fairness and justice, it is remaking the contract.
19 Id. at 293-294.
20 6 WLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1931.
21 Id. § 1937.
6
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This is entirely permissible and in line with the modern tendency
to stress the relational aspect of contracts,22 under which the law
has much more to say about the terms and consequences of a con-
tract than was permissible when the will or intent of the parties was
thought to be controlling. And yet, having read into the contract
an implied condition excusing performance in a particular case
of impossibility, the court pays lip service to the now discredited
"will" theory of contracts by purporting to give effect only to
the intent of the parties, as if that intent had been evidenced by
an express condition. Actually, by so construing the contract as
to find that the parties impliediy intended to provide for an excuse
in the particular case of impossibility, the court is merely spelling
out the rights and duties of the parties as fixed by law. This be-
comes clear when it is realized that the conditions read into the
contract are conditions implied in law and not in fact.
Having used this doctrine of implied conditions as a means
of recognizing impossibility as an excuse under some circumstances,
many courts then state flatly that impossibility is not an excuse
for failure to perform an absolute or unconditional promise.2"
Such a statement, however, is almost meaningless in view of the
fact that until the court has refused to imply the condition, it is
never certain that the promise is unconditional. About all that the
statement can mean is that whenever from the express language of
the contract or from the surrounding circumstances the court is
convinced that the promisor has assumed the risk of impossibility,
it is not unfair to hold him to that assumption. Or stated another
way, if the court finds that the promisor has not assumed that risk,
it would be unfair to hold him to a performance "vitally different
from what should reasonably have been within the contemplation
of both parties when they entered into the contract." 24 Note that
if the promisor is held to such a vitally different performance on
the ground that he might have protected himself by express pro-
vision in the contract, the court would certainly be enforcing a
contract different from the one the parties may reasonably be said
to have made; whereas, if he is excused under such circumstances,
the court, though to some extent remaking the contract, would come
nearer to enforcing the contract as the parties probably intended
it to be.
22 Pound, supra note 3, at 228-230.
23 6 WILLIs TON, CONTRACTS § 1937.
24 d. § 1931.
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The case of Hiuminsky v. Gary National Bank" is a good ex-
ample of the assumption by the promisor of the risk of impossibility.
In June 1917 the bank contracted to transmit a sum of money to
a bank in Moscow, there to be credited to the account of the plain-
tiff's wife. Despite the fact that the Russian Revolution had al-
ready started in March of that year the bank guaranteed trans-
mission of the money. Performance of the contract was delayed
until it became impossible because of the success of the Soviet
Revolution. In holding the bank liable, the court said that
"... the obligation assumed by defendant was an absolute
one and not subject to any of the qualifications which we find
in most of the cases cited by counsel for defendant, such as
agreements to remit in the usual and customary way or sub-
ject to certain rules and regulations, or contingent on war or
other unusual conditions. Therefore, the defendant is not
excused. ... '
Another distinction which should be noted is that between
existing and supervening impossibility. Impossibility may be due
to facts existing at the time the promise is made or to facts arising
subsequently. The former is existing impossiblity; the latter,
supervening impossibility.27 Most of the cases dealing with the
problem involve supervening rather than existing impossibility. In
the comparatively few cases where there was an existing im-
possibility the courts, sensing the analogy to cases of mistake, have
had less difficulty in granting relief. Thus in the Paxton Lumber
Company case, in holding that where there iwas a promise to cut
950,000 feet of timber from defendant's land which contained no
such amount, nonperformance was excusable on the ground of im-
possibility, our court said:
"Frequently the impossibility of performing a contract
and mutual mistake excusing performance, when interposed in
defense of an action thereon, have somewhat similar character-
istics, and where the impossibility is due to a circumstance
existing at the time of the bargain and relating to the subject
matter thereof without the knowledge of either party, it par-
takes of the nature of a mutual mistake, and excuses perform-
ance to the extent the subject matter had no potential exis-
tence. " 8
25107 W. Va. 658, 150 S. E. 9 (1929).
2 GId. at 663.
27 6 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS §1933; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§456-457.
2 8 Paxton Lumber Co. v. Panther Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 341, syl. 5, 98 S. E.
.563 (1919).
8
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The most important result of the distinction between existing
and supervening impossibility is the fact that existing impossibil-
ity unknown to the parties prevents the creation of any duty where-
as supervening impossibility discharges a duty which has already
arisen.21 Of course in the case of a known existing impossibility
the contract may create a duty if there is a manifest intent to assume
the risk of overcoming the impossibility,30 but such cases are rare.
In most cases the existing impossibility is unknown and since the
parties "deal with reference to unknown existing facts in the same
way they do with supervening events," 31 the law does likewise.
With these general observations out of the way let us turn to
a more detailed consideration of the West Virginia cases. A good
starting point is the language above from the Roberts case in which
our court, after stating the general rule to be that impossibility is
not an excuse, went on to say that there are three recognized ex-
ceptions to this general rule. These exceptions cover so much
ground, however, and include numerically so great a majority of
the cases in which the question has arisen, it may now be fairly
stated that, as is often the case, the exceptions have become the
general rule and the former rule the exception. Hence in contrast
to the language in the Roberts case Williston's affirmative statement
in respect to these same three situations is preferable. After recog-
nizing that not. all inds of impossibility will be an excuse, he goes
on to say:
"There are, however, three classes of cases where it is
well settled that the promisor will be excused unless he either
expressly agreed in the contract to assume the risk of perform-
ance whether possible or not, or the impossibility was due to
his fault ... The three classes ... alluded to are:
(1) Impossibility due to domestic law;
(2) Impossibility due to the death or illness of one
who by the terms of the contract was to do an act requiring
his personal performance;
(3) Impossibility due to fortuitous destruction or
change in character of something to which the contract
related, or which by the terms of the contract was made
a necessary means of performance. "2
As will be seen, the results reached by our court, if not always its
language, amply support Williston's statement of the general rule.
29RESTATEMENT, CoNTrIxcTS §§ 456-457.
30 6 WIL ST oN, CONTRACTs § 1933.
31 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §456, comment e.
32 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs §1935.
9
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Consider first the cases in which 'impossibility is due to a
change in domestic law. In these cases the contract when made
was legal, but performance has subsequently been prohibited or
prevented by law. It should first be noted that the impossibility
involved in such a case is ordinarily not impossibility in fact. The
contract in most cases could still be performed if the promisor were
willing to break the law.33 He is excused ,because it would be im-
practicable and obviously unfair for the law to hold him account-
able for his failure to render performance which because of a change
in law has become illegal or impossible. An example of the rare
case in which there is impossibility in fact is given in the Restate-
ment: A sells land to B who promises that no building shall be
erected on it. If the land is then taken by eminent domain for the
building of a railroad station, B's performance of his promise
would in fact be impossible. Hence his nonperformance would be
excused in the absence of facts showing that he intended to
assume the risk of this contingency. 4
Dorr v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.3" involves a stock illustration of
impossibility due to change of law. The railway conpany in con-
sideration of the granting of a right of way promised to issue an
annual pass to ,the grantor. Later a statute forbade the issuance
of such passes. It was held that the company's duty to issue the
pass was discharged. Similiarly, in another case where the railway
company had contracted to haul refuse from the plaintiff's plant
without charge, it was held that the company was excused from per-
formance after the passage of a statute which prohibited the fur-
nishing of service for a greater or less compensation than was set
forth in its rate tariffs.30
krany other West Virginia cases apply the same general
principle. In Bunch v. Short3 7 it was held that nonperformance of
a contract to deposit public funds in a bank without requiring the
payment of interest was excused by the enactment of a statute re-
quiring depositories of public funds to pay interest on daily
balances. So also, the contract of a county to employ a district
road superintendent was discharged when the legislature abolished
the office.36 The case of Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Coznty
33 Id. §1938; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §458.
34 RESTATE;mENT, CONTRACTS § 458, illustration 1.
35 78 W. Va. 150, 88 S. E. 666, L. R. A. 1916E 622 (1916).
3 Whitaker Glessner Co. v. Wheeling Terminal Ry., 99 W. Va. 38, 127 S. E.
639 (1925).
37 78 W. Va. 764, 90 S. E. 810. (1916).
38 Richardson v. Raleigh County Court, 93 W. Va. 604, 117 S. E. 482 (1923).
10
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Court of Kanawha County,39 althought it contains no discussion of
the defense of impossibility, may well be explained on that ground-
It was held that the county was released from its contract to pur-
chase electricity for the lighting of a bridge when the legislature
transferred jurisdiction of the bridge to the State Road Commis-
sion.
There is some difference of opinion among courts generally as
to whether prohibition or prevention of performance by judicial.
executive or administrative order comes within the principle of
impossibility due to change of law.' That it should seems clear
and our court has so held. For example, in Patton & Shaver v. Elk
River Navigation Co.,41 P contracted to cut and deliver to D tim-
ber on land claimed by D. After the contract had been partly per-
formed, in a suit by other claimants P was enjoined from delivering
a large quantity of logs already cut. In an action for damages in
respect to the cutting of these logs, the court gave judgment for P,
stating that his default in failing to deliver was excusable because
delivery had been prohibited by judicial order. The same result has
been reached in the case of administrative orders. Thus, in Ca'letoii
Mining & Power Co. v. West Virginia N. Ry.,42 it was held that
a contract for the purchase of a railroad was discharged by the
refusal of the Interstate Commerce Commission to grant to the
purchaser a certificate of convenience and necessity. Similarly, an
order of the banking commissioner imposing conditions upon pay-
ment of deposits after the reopening of a bank was held to be an
excuse for the bank's failure to pay according to the terms of the
original deposit.4 3 In view of these holdings in respect to judicial
and administrative orders it seems reasonable to assume that the
same rule would be applied in the case of an executive order render-
ing performance illegal or impossible.
Impossibility due to a change in foreign law does not come
within the principle now under discussion. It does not follow, how-
ever, as has often been held that such impossibility is no excuse.
There is an impossibility in fact and the modern tendency is to
recognize that prohibition or prevention of performance by change
of foreign law is an excuse unless the promisor may fairly be said
to have assumed the risk of such impossibility.4"
39 116 W. Va. 306, 180 S. E. 264 (1935).
40 6 WILLISTON, CoN'-nOcTs § 1939.
41:13 W. Va. 259 (1878).
42106 W. Va. 126, 145 S. E. 42 (1928).
43 Eskew v. Buckhannon Bank, 115 W. Va. 579, 177 S. E. 433 (1934).
44 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1938.
11
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Consider next Williston's second group of cases in which the
courts have recognized the defense of impossibility. From earliest
times it has been held that, in the case of a contract for personal
service, the death or illness of the one who is to render the service
is an excuse for nonperformance." Although normally it is the
promisor voho is to render the service, as in the case of an ordinary
contract of employment, he sometimes contracts that another per-
son shall do so. In such case the death or illness of the other person
will be an excuse, just as the promisor's own death or incapacity
would in the ordinary case. This rule is so well established that
there has been comparatively little litigation on the point in West
Virginia. When a case does arise the decision will turn on the ques-
tion whether in the particular contract the services were of such a
personal nature as to come within the rule, rather than on any ques-
tion as to the correctness of the rule itself. In Kelly v. Thompson
Land Co., which held that a promise to form and promote a cor-
poration was personal in nature, we find this statement:
"Where the acts stipulated in an agreement require the
exercise of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, ex-
perience, judgment, discretion, integrity or other personal
qualifications of one or both parties the agreement is said to
be of a personal nature. It seems to be an accepted rule that
in contracts of this kind the death of one who was to perform
a personal service shall dissolve the contract ....
". .. So all that concerns us now is whether the under-
taking of Thompson, yet unperformed, was personal."1
4
In the third group of cases mentioned by Williston impossibil-
ity was due to the destruction or nonexistence of specific property
necessary for performance. Although from very early times the
law recognized as an excuse impossibility due to change of law or
to the death or illness of one who was to render personal services,
"it was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century that it
was held that the destruction or non-existence of inanimate sub-
ject matter to which a contract related would excuse a promisor
from liability."'47 Despite the comparatively recent origin of this
principle its soundness is now generally admitted. The expressions
of our court in the few West Virginia cases containing any dis-
cussion of the point are for the most part in accord with the general
rule. A limited statement of the principle is found in the quotation
45 Id. §§ 1931 and 1940; RESTATMEENT, CONTRACTS § 459.
46 112 W. Va. 454, 458, 164 S. E. 667 (1932).
47 6 WmLISToN, CONTRACTS § 1931.
12
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from the Roberts case, discussed and criticized above, to the effect
that impossibility is an excuse "where the continued existence of
the subject matter is an implied condition of the contract.' 8 The
typical example is a contract to sell specific goods which are
fortuitously destroyed before time for delivery. Though no West
Virginia case was found expressly holding that under such cir-
cumstances the seller's failure to deliver was excused, there can be
little doubt that our court would so hold.
Although the statement in the Roberts case covers supervening
impossibility due to the destruction of the subject matter it is not
broad enough to cover the case of existing impossibility due to non-
existence of the subject matter. It is clear, however, that such
existing impossibility is an excuse. In the Paxton Lumber Company
case which involved only a partial existing impossibility there was
a contract to sell 950,000 feet of timber from a particular tract. Un-
known to the parties the tract contained considerably less than the
amount contracted for. After the seller had delivered all of the
existing timber he was sued because of his failure to deliver the
balance. It was held that he was excused, the court stating that:
"If the parties to a, contract enter into it under the belief
that the subject matter is in existence, and in effect condition
their contract thereon, no contract exists if the subject matter
is not then in existence, and if it exists in part only, perform-
ance after exhaustion of such part will be excused." 49
Recognition of the same principle is implicit in the later case
of Taylor v. Thomas 0 The actual holding in this case was that
under a coal lease providing for minimum royalty payments, ex-
haustion of the coal was no excuse for failure to pay the rental so
long as the lessee retained possession for the purpose of using a
right of way to remove coal from adjoining land. The intimation
is clear that had the lessee surrendered possession after the coal was
exhausted he would have been discharged from further liability
under the lease. The situation in the Taylor case should be dis-
tinguished from that found in cases like National Coal Co. v. Over-
holt.51 The agreement in the Over7wlt case, though in the form of a
lease with provision for payment of minimum royalties, was under
48 Roberts v. American Column &, Lumber Co., 76 W. Va. 290, 293, 85 S. E.
535 (1915). See also 6 WILLISTON, CoraxCTs §§ 1946-1950; RESTATEMNT,
CoNTRzcTs § 460.
49 Paxton Lumber Co. v. Panther Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 341, syl. 6, 98 S. E.
563 (1919).
Go 106 W. Va. 376, 145 S. E. 633 (1928).
a 81 W. Va. 427, 94 S. E. 735 (1917).
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established West Virginia principles construed to be not a true
lease but a sale of the coal in place, subject to the condition that the
coal be removed during the term of the lease. Note that this was
not a sale of a definite amount of coal but was a sale of all existing
coal without any guarantee as to amount. The purchase price for
the coal was to be the total minimum royalty plus such additional
sum as might become due if the lessee should mine more coal than
was covered by ihe minimum royalty. Under these circumstances it
was very properly held that the exhaustion of the coal did not dig-
charge the purchaser's promise to pay the agreed price. This is
simply an application of the general principle that the law does not
inquire into the adequacy of consideration.12 This line of reason-
ing was all that was necessary to a decision and we may properly
discount certain statements found in the case in reference to true
leases, particularly so since they are inconsistent with the principle
recognized in the Taylor case and applied in the Paxton Lumber
Company case.
The principle under discussion will not only excuse the
promisor when the subject matter of the contract is nonexistent
or is subsequently destroyed, but is also broad enough to excuse
him when specific property necessary to the performance of the
contract has been destroyed.3 A common example is a contract
to repair or do work on an existing building which is destroyed or
materially damaged before the repairs have been begun or com-
pleted. It is generally held that the contract is discharged and even
if the owner should rebuild there would be no further duty on the
part of the contractor.r4 Such a case is to be distinguished from
that of a contract to erect a building. There the risk of the destruc-
tion of the building before completion of the work is generally said
to have been assumed by the builder."
The West Virginia law on this point is not clear. In Chapman
v. J. W. Beltz & Sons Co.,"6 there was a contract for the remodeling
and rebuilding of a store, some of the old walls to be used in the
erection of the new building. After much of the work had been
done but before its completion, the building collapsed wifhout any
fault on the part of the contractor. The owner notified the con-
tractor that he would restore the building to its original condition
521 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 115.
53 6 id. § 1948.
54 Id. §1965.
55 Id. §1964.
56 48 W. Va. 1, 35 S. E. 1013 (1900).
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and would then expect completion of the work Overruling the con-
tractor's contention that he was discharged, the court held him
guilty of a breach of contract for refusing to complete the building.
This holding is not only inconsistent with the general rule as stated
above but is also at variance with the case of Hysell v. Sterling
Coal & Manufacturihig Co., 7 decided only one year before. In that
case there was a contract to put a roof on a house which was des-
troyed daring the course of the work. The jury having found for
the contractor on the issue whether the fire was due to his negli-
gence, the court held that he was excused from further performance
under the contract and that he was entitled to recover in quantum
meridt for the part of the roof which was completed before the fire.
Query whether this correct holding was overruled only one
year later. The cases might conceivably be distinguished on the
ground that the repairs in the Ctapman case were so extensive that
the contract was really one for the erection rather than for the re-
pair of a building, whereas in the Hysell case we have a true repair
contract. What makes this as well as any other effort to distinguish
the cases doubtful is the fact that the court did not even mention
the Hysell case in its later opinion. Consequently, about all that
can be said is that it remains to be seen which case the court will
follow when the point is again presented.
It also remains to be seen whether in line with the Restatement
and with the recent trend noted by Williston, our court is pre-
pared to extend the doctrine of impossibility to additional situ-
ations. Take for example the fourth class of cases mentioned by
Williston, "where impossibility is due to the failure of some
means of performance, contemplated but not contracted for.''s
According to the Restatement this should be an excuse unless an in-
tent was manifested to assume the risk of such failure. 59 In Vir-
ginian Export Coal Co. v. Rowland Land Co.,60 the lessee of coal
lands sought to rescind the lease on the ground that at the time it
was made both parties contemplated that the lessee would be able to
obtain railroad connections for shipment of the coal, which he was
unable to do. The court intimated quite clearly that even if this were
true, the lessee would not be released, it being "the duty of the
contracting parties to provide against contingencies". The actual
57 46 W. Va. 158, 33 S. E. 95 (1899).
-s 6 WmL sTox, CoNRACrs §1935.
9 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §460, comment d.
60 100 W. Va. 559, 131 S. E. 253 (1926).
a1 Id. at 577.
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holding of the case, however, was much narrower and was not in-
consistent with the rule of the Restatement. The court first called
attention to a rider attached to the lease, providing that if the
lessee should be unable to obtain the contemplated railroad con-
nections with the Virginian Railway because of a clause in the
lease giving certain preferences to the Chesapeake & Ohio, he should
have the right to surrender the lease within ninety days. The
court then held that the lessee by executing this rider had mani-
fested an intent to assume the risk of his inability to procure the
connections for any other reason. Despite the fact that this holding
is consistent with the rule as set forth in the Restatement, it is
doubtful that our court is yet prepared to accept the doctrine that
impossibility is an excuse when due to the failure of a contem-
plated means of performance. This conclusion is based not only on
the intimation to that effect in the opinion in the principal case
but also on the fact that our court has consistently stated the rule
as to impossibility in its original strict form, and has dealt with the
situations where impossibility is an excuse as exceptional. This
method of approach naturally tends to delay recognition of addi-
tional situations where impossibility should constitute an excuse.
In the background of all the discussion so far has been the
implicit if not expressed qualification that it "is only fortuitous im-
possibility that excuses from liability." '0 2 If the promisor is himsel '
the cause of the impossibility or if it is due to his fault, he should not
be excused. An interesting example of this is found in the recent
case of Odefl v. Criss & Shaver, Inc. 3 The plaintiff, who carried
on a nonunion trucking business, contracted to do some hauling
for the defendant. After the making of this contract but before
performance was due, defendant's plant was unionized. In the
agreement which defendant signed with the union, his employees
were privileged to refuse to load nonunion trucks. As a conse-
quence, the defendant was unable- to perform his contract with
the plaintiff. When sued he claimed the defense of impossibility.
but was quite properly held liable. The court plced its decision
on the ground that this was not ai case of impossibility but of mere
unforeseen difficulty. This proposition is at least debatable and it
would seem to be a better explanation to say that impossibility, and
a fortiori mere unforeseen difficulty, of performance is not an ex-
cuse when it is due to the voluntary act of the promisor, as here his
signing of the union contract.
60 6 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS §1959.
03 14 S. E. (2d) 767 (W. Va. 1941).
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Attention should also be called to another general principle
applicable to all cases of impossibility. The law does not require
that the impossibility should actually occur. It is enough that there
be a reasonable apprehension of impossibility. As is said in the Re-
statement,
"Where a promisor apprehends before or during the time
for performance of a promise in a bargain that there will be
such impossibility of performance as would discharge or sus-
pend a duty under the promise or that performance will seri-
ously jeopardize his own life or health or that of others, he is
not liable, unless a contrary intention is manifested or he is
guilty of contributing fault, for failing to begin or to continue
performance while such apprehension exists, if the failure to
begin or to continue performance is reasonable.'
'
1
4
Note that this recognizes the impracticability of requiring perform-
ance which will endanger life or health. In the case of Vale v.
80ter & Dunjbarl" our court overlooked this principle. Under a
contract which called for the steady operation of a saw mill, it was
held that The existence of a smallpox epidemic in the neighborhood
would not excuse performance unless the promisor could show that
lie was unable by the exercise of due diligence to procure employees
who were willing to assume the risk of catching the disease. This
holding is certainly in conflict with the spirit if not the letter of
the Restatement rule.
The West Virginia cases are in accord with the general view
that when part performance has been rendered under a contract
which is discharged by impossibility, the party receiving the part
performance must pay its reasonable value unless what he received
can be returned within a reasonable time.6 6 This is true without re-
gard to which party was excused by the impossibility. Thus in the
Hysell case, where the promisor was excused from his duty to put a
roof on a house which was destroyed by fire he was allowed to re-
cover the value of that part of the roof which had been completed
before the fire."' On the other hand, in Bell v. Kanawha Traction &
Electric Co.,68 where it was held that the duty of the carrier to issue
an annual pass was excused by subsequent change of law, the other
party was allowed to recover the value of the right of way con-
veyed to the carrier as consideration for its promise.
6 4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §465.
6r 58 W. Va. 353, 52 S. E. 313 (1905).
66 6 WrmLisTox, CONTRACTS §1972; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §468.
67 Hysell v. Sterling Coal & Mfg. Co., 46 W. Va. 158, 33 S. E. 95! (1899).
68 83 W. Va. 640, 98 S. E. 885 (1919).
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For the most part the results reached by our court are in
accord with the rules as stated by Williston and the Restatement
in so far as those rules have received general recognition. The
present indication is that our court will at least be slow in follow-
ing the recent trend extending the excuse of impossibility to other
and newer situations. This reluctance to be among the first to
change the law is not open to serious criticism, particularly so
since our court has not yet shown any inclination to be among
"the last to lay the old aside."
69 For other cases not discussed or cited in this article, see those collected by
Donley in REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs, W. VA. ANNOT. (1938) §§454-469.
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